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ABSTRACT: Zeno’s Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle 
Way (Mūlamādhyamakakārikā, MMK) Chapter 2 (MMK/2) contain paradoxical, dialectic 
arguments thought to indicate that there is no valid explanation of motion, hence there is no 
physical or generic motion. There are, however, diverse interpretations of the latter text, and 
I argue they apply to Zeno’s Arrow as well. I also find that many of the interpretations are 
dependent on a mathematical analysis of material motion through space and time. However, 
with modern philosophy and physics we find that the link from no explanation to no 
phenomena is invalid and that there is a valid explanation and understanding of physical 
motion. Hence, those arguments are both invalid and false, which banishes the MMK/2 and 
The Arrow under this and derivative interpretations to merely the history of philosophy. 
However, a view that maintains their relevance is that each is used as a koan or sequence of 
koans designed to assist students in spiritual meditation practice. This view is partly justified 
by the realization that both Nāgārjuna and Zeno were likely meditation masters in addition to 
being logicians. The works are, therefore, not works that should be assessed as having valid 
arguments and true conclusions by the standards of modern analytic philosophy—contrary to 
some of the literature—but rather are therapeutic and perhaps more appropriately 
considered as part of an experientially focused philosophy such as existentialism, 
phenomenology or religion. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  SUMMARY 
 
The context of this paper is a larger project involving examination of “ancient 
wisdom” as the non-conceptual insights and realizations achieved by meditation 
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masters of the past which may have enduring relevance, compared with the logical, 
philosophical arguments and explanations, which I view as historically and culturally 
relative. I suggest that those arguments, etc. generally require revision into our 
modern context, since we generally use different concepts, logic, and scientific 
understanding. I define the ‘modern context’ as reliance on 21st century analytic 
philosophy, science, philosophy of science and logical clarity in argumentation, if not 
formal logic.1  
 I examine Zeno's Arrow and MMK/2 in some detail below. For this introduction, 
suffice it to say that each suggests that either ‘movement’ is impossible, or perhaps 
that understanding of ‘movement’ is impossible. ‘Movement’ is yet to be defined. 
However, the arguments are expressed as if such movement is spatio-temporal 
movement of physical entities. This may be a metaphor for some more generic kind 
of movement, and we discuss that more fully below.  
 For now, consider the more literal expressions: The Arrow states that since at any 
moment of time an inflight arrow is in only one location, it is not moving in that 
moment, and therefore, since the entire flight is the simple sum of such moments, it 
does not move at all. MMK Chapter 2 has many arguments that seem to deny the 
existence of movement in various forms and for various reasons, but the first verse 
and some that follow express arguments similar to the Arrow. There are several 
interpretations we can conclude as the meaning or intent of these arguments: 
 
a. Literal Ontologic Interpretation: The arguments could be a denial that anything 
physical moves in space and time. This would certainly support the label as 
‘paradox’, since we can directly experience movement. This view is easily argued 
against, and has been with aplomb and humor by Shimony (in Salmon 1970) and 
Mabbett (1984) in their little vignettes of a lion moving towards Zeno or arrow fired 
at Nāgārjuna (anachronistically by Zeno), respectively, and each of them refusing to 
move since movement is impossible. Any rational person cannot easily defend a 
literal interpretation of ‘movement’ as the change of spatial position of a physical 
entity over time. Hence, in order to use the literal interpretation, we need to approach 
an understanding of ‘movement’ in a more deeply philosophic way, considering that 
term or the entire argument as metaphor. 
 
b. Epistemic Interpretation: Zeno’s four paradoxes have been interpreted together as 
arguments against any rational, analytic, philosophical understanding of the nature of 
space and time in any of the four options of continuous or discrete space and 
continuous or discrete time (Siderits and O’Brien 1976 following Brumbaugh 1964). 
Nāgārjuna’s MMK chapter 2 has arguments against the atomistic/discrete nature of 
space and time, consistent with the generally accepted interpretation that MMK 
opposes the atomistic philosophies that had been common in his time. However, it 
also can be viewed as arguments against a continuous space and time. This is 
reasonable, considering the fact that we really didn’t have the conceptual apparatus to 
                                                
1 In a sense, my use of the term ‘modern context’ to include analytic philosophy is perhaps redundant, 
since the latter can be interpreted to be the same as what I define as the former. I comment on this 
below. 
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understand continuity until Newton and Leibniz invented calculus, and even when 
Weierstrauss, Dedekind and others refined it.  The conclusions of the ancient 
arguments do not, however, usually entail that we therefore need more mathematical 
technology to understand the nature of space and time in these options. That would 
be a modern conclusion (if it were not for the fact that we do have the math). For 
Zeno and Nāgārjuna, the common conclusion drawn is that since there is no 
understanding, that no understanding is possible, hence there is no real space and 
time, and therefore no real movement. Again, ‘movement’ may be physical, or 
movement of consciousness through samsara, or a more generic change or pluralism. 
Regardless of what kind of movement we are considering, this conclusion is also 
easily argued against, but has not been acknowledged in the Buddhist philosophic 
literature and therefore such arguments are offered here as a contribution of this 
paper.  
 Recall that in this paper I am concerned with determining what interpretation is 
true to reality as we know it today, not simply true to the intention of Zeno and 
Nāgārjuna. It may be the case that both Zeno and Nāgārjuna had either the literal or 
the epistemic interpretations in mind. However, if that is the case, I then point out 
counter arguments to indicate that these interpretations do not hold analytic water in 
the modern context. 
 In summary (with more detail below), my arguments against the Epistemic 
Interpretation being true in the modern context are, first, that inference from the lack 
of rational, analytic, philosophic understanding does not entail the lack of true 
existence of a phenomenon (rather, it indicates we need better understanding). The 
inference from no explanation to no phenomena I label Eleatic Logic after Zeno of 
Elea. Second, we have good, rational, analytic, philosophic, and mathematical 
physics understanding of physical motion through space and time in any of the four 
options; and finally, our current, best, empirically justified physics theories state 
unequivocally that space and time are both continuous, hence we need not even 
consider the other three options. The first two of my arguments are fairly 
uncontroversial, but the last may be controversial. However, it is not even necessary 
in light of the other two, but is just put forth to simplify matters. If it rather muddies 
the waters for the reader, we can discard it. 
 
c. Property-Nature Ontologic Interpretation: Here movement is a placeholder for any 
characteristic. In this common interpretation, the MMK arguments could be and have 
frequently been interpreted to deny svabhāva of anything in nature or mind. Hopkins 
(1996, 36) lists 17 synonyms for svabhāva or the ‘self-nature of phenomena’ 
including inherent existence, ultimate existence, true existence, existence as its own 
reality, natural existence or existence by way of its own character, substantial 
existence, objective existence, and existence through its own entitiness. This 
traditionally is expressed as characteristics, properties, or essential nature that is 
independent, singular or permanent. The middle way Buddhist philosophy 
(mādhyamaka), of which MMK is a part, generally, and MMK specifically, deny that 
there are such things. MMK therefore examines many concepts and phenomena and 
argues against any substantial existence. In terms of motion, there is a relationship 
between motion and what is being moved. Part of the issue with the property-nature 
interpretation is reification, i.e., when we reify motion, for example, it becomes a 
permanent, essential property. Yet how can movement exist as such a property when 
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the object has stopped moving? Hence, reification of properties into svabhāva 
substance is problematic in the MMK view.  
 
  We find many different kinds of arguments within MMK generally, and even 
within just chapter 2. I categorize many of these below in what I call ‘interpretation 
clusters’. I argue that most of the common interpretations of chapter 2 and Zeno’s 
Arrow are dependent on the Literal Ontologic or the Epistemic Interpretations 
described above, which I lump into a single category below. Since those arguments 
do not withstand analysis under the modern contextual microscope, this is a problem, 
and we must move on to other interpretations if we are to maintain the modern 
relevance of these works. 
 
1.2    ELEATIC LOGIC 
 
Many Buddhist teachings over the millennia argue using Eleatic Logic, which is a 
variety of rationalist in contrast with empirical logic. By ‘rationalist’ I refer to the 
aspect of many arguments in Buddhist teachings (and even in modern Western 
metaphysics) that fail to demonstrate sufficient respect for empirical science, but 
rather promote the view that a ‘logical’ argument based on ‘commonsense’ entails a 
‘true’ conclusion about the physical world. In this particular instance, my use of the 
term is restricted to the Eleatic Logic of arguing from the lack of an explanation to the 
unreality of a phenomenon. An empirical-based argument would observe the reality 
of the phenomena, recognize that we have no good explanation, and then proceed to 
try to devise one. 
 When Eleatic Logic is applied to phenomena of the physical world, paradoxes of 
explanation leave us scratching our heads about the illusory quality of what we 
perceive—are they real, or not? However, there are many more and diverse 
interpretations of many of these teachings, and it is not clear that we are stuck in a 
rationalist logic, although it is at least superficially discussed this way. Vasubandhu’s 
‘Proof of Idealism’ is an example from Nāgārjuna’s era, where our lack of 
understanding follows to a cittamatra conclusion that everything is mind: “Therefore, 
atomic distinctions must be supposed and that (atom) is not proven to be simple. It 
being unproven, it is not proven that forms, etcetera, are the objects of the eye, 
etcetera. Thus, it is proven that they are mere perceptions” (Kapstein 1988, 51). From 
analysis of the fallacies in atomic views in Abhidharma, Vasubandhu concludes not 
just that our analysis of atomic views has flaws, but that there are no simple atoms. 
Since atoms are supposed to be the building blocks of all entities, he concludes that 
such entities have no substantial existence (svabhāva), and that they and all matter are 
mere perceptions, without objective reality separate from perception and mind. This 
is a major example of how Buddhist philosophers grapple with the problems of 
atomistic philosophy, while at the same time not having the mathematical techniques 
necessary to understand its alternative, continuity.  
 Many contemporary teachers, such as Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso, Rinpoche, 
express a similar view as things not being real because they don’t stand up to 
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analysis. In his commentary on the opening homage to MMK (Gyamtso 2003), Ari 
Goldfield (the translator, under Khenpo’s guidance) interprets the last line as “I 
prostate to the perfect Buddha, the supreme of all who speak, Who completely 
dissolves all fabrications and teaches peace” (Gyamts 2003, 1). Gyamtso’s 
commentary is that  
 
…all of the phenomena of samsara and nirvana are dependently arisen mere appearances, 
and that therefore their true nature transcends the concepts of arising and ceasing, of 
permanence and extinction, of coming and going, and of being one thing or different 
things. In fact, essential reality (dharmata) transcends all conceptual fabrications… 
Suffering comes from taking things to be real… (Gyamtso 2003, 1-2)2  
 
A common interpretation of MMK is that it is promoting the idea that there is no 
rational, analytic, philosophical understanding of any concept, thus all phenomena are 
illusory, or don’t exist ultimately.  
 Again, Chapter 2 addresses motion in a way that is similar to Zeno’s four 
paradoxes, beginning with the first verse that is very similar to the Arrow.  Does this 
mean that Nāgārjuna is advocating for the non-existence of motion? This would be 
the case only if we interpret ‘non-existence’ as ‘lacking svabhāva’. Hence, motion is 
real, by at least many of our standard definitions: “not artificial, fraudulent, or 
illusory… occurring or existing in actuality… existing as a physical entity… having 
objective independent existence” (Real 2011). The last option and some others I 
didn’t quote bring us to the classic definition of svabhāva as independent, singular 
and permanent. Hence, in this definition it may be legitimate to say that nothing is 
real, since the emptiness (śūnyatā) doctrine of mādhyamaka is fundamentally the 
denial that anything has svabhāva. However, common usage (in my estimate as a 
competent speaker of English) is that we accept real things even though they may be 
interdependent with other things, composite and impermanent. Yet, this opens us up 
to many philosophical problems: how do we even identify anything if it is 
interdependent with other things, made of other things, and changes one moment to 
the next? How can we even think that such a thing exists at all? Here, then, is at least 
one modern understanding of the core issues raised by MMK. 
 
1.3  ZENO AND NAGARJUNA 
 
Several authors have compared and contrasted Zeno’s paradoxes and Nāgārjuna’s 
MMK Chapter 2.3 Both similarities and differences have been identified. However, 
                                                
2 This is, of course, consistent with work by such as Shantarakshita (Padmakara 2005), who analyzes 
wholes and parts in the neither one nor many argument to conclude that things transcend the concept of 
parts. “Real”, in the sense of Gyamtso, indicates the classical attribution of svabhāva, as ‘truly real’, or 
‘absolutely or ultimately real’ as permanent, singular and independent. Since (according to 
mādhyamaka) there are no such things, nothing is real. However, this is a straw man. Nowadays, we 
are fine saying that things are real, but interdependent, impermanent and composite.   
3 Bhattacharya (1980) suggests the first to identify ‘a parallelism’ between the two was Jacobi in 1911 
and the former goes on to cite Ingalis’ 1954 characterization of Indian philosophy’s method as 
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there are many interpretations of what each means, and what purpose each had.4 This 
paper is designed as a contribution to that literature.  
 The common view is that both are discussing physical objects moving in physical 
space and time as examples of a more generic motion or other characteristics of 
phenomena and mind’s interaction with phenomena. Differences abound in 
interpreting with what kind of generic motion each is concerned, i.e. in terms of 
reification of properties. Both may be addressing universal pluralism, i.e. movement 
of parts in relationship to wholes. Since he argues against such pluralism, Zeno is 
classed by many as a monist, while Plato/Socrates in Parmenides reports that both are 
jointly opposed to both monism and pluralism. Nāgārjuna could also be discussing 
movement of beings through samsara and rebirth, although I argue that this applies to 
Zeno also. We could adapt MMK language to say that both are looking at generic 
arising. Nāgārjuna is usually interpreted as defending no views, but attacking them 
all. I argue that Zeno may be doing the same (although elsewhere I argue that the 
former has a definite view). We have more of a context for Nāgārjuna’s chapter, i.e. 
MMK and mādhyamaka generally, yet there is no consensus about the meaning of it, 
let alone the meaning of the MMK as a whole or Madhyamaka as a whole (see 
below). 
 We know little about Zeno and have none of his writings. He is well known for 
four paradoxes of motion, which have inspired hundreds if not thousands of 
responses. He was a student—perhaps main disciple and adopted son—of Parmenides 
of Elea in the 400s BCE. All we know of him is reported by others—mostly by Plato 
in Parmenides, Phaedrus and Sophist; by Aristotle, especially in dispute against his 
paradoxes; and by historians hundreds of years removed, such as Diogenes Laertes. In 
Parmenides, in their visit to Athens, Parmenides is the elder (~60) respected 
philosopher, Zeno his disciple and at least philosophical son and defender at ~40, and 
Socrates near 20 years old. Of Zeno’s philosophy, we have some indications by Plato 
and Aristotle, but nothing systematic, and we really know very little. Of Parmenides’, 
we have several fragments—providing a significant indication of his ideas—yet still 
inviting speculation.5 
                                                                                                                                      
grammatical while that of the West uses mathematical (with bibliography on this comparison covering 
1956-1978), mentioning Zeno and Nāgārjuna examples. (see citations in Bhattacharya). Siderits and 
O’Brien (1976) discuss “…the clear correspondence of at least one of Nāgārjuna’s arguments against 
motion to one of Zeno’s Paradoxes [the Arrow]…” (281). See also Mabbett (1984), Galloway (1987) 
and Arnold (2012) for articles addressing the comparison, and many commentaries on the complete 
translation of the text for such parallelism. For instance, Garfield’s (1995) footnote 34 on p.125 says 
that the “parallels…are evident”. Mabbett (1984) cites Jacobi and also Stcherbatsky, Kajiyama and 
Murti (see Mabbett for citations). Interestingly, Mabbett cites Stcherbatsky as noting that there is “no 
trace of Nagarjuna having known them (Zeno and Parmenides)”. See McEvilley (1981, 1982, 2002). 
4 For example, Siderits and O’Brien write “There is no question but that Zeno and Nāgārjuna put their 
respective refutations of motion to completely different uses.” (281). 
5 For background on Parmenides see Palmer (2016). My main sources were Lombardo (1982) and 
Kingsley (2003). For background on Zeno see Palmer (2017), Plato’s aforementioned dialogues and 
Aristotle’s Physics Book VI, chapter 9 lines 5-9 as examined below. 
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 Although there is considerable uncertainty in who the writer of MMK was (or 
even when and where in India he lived) it is consistent with current understanding and 
teachings by current authorities in Tibetan lineages that teach the mādhyamaka that 
the author of the first significant philosophical formulation of mādhyamaka after the 
prajñāpāramitā sutras was named Nāgārjuna and was an Indian Buddhist philosopher 
of the 1st-2nd centuries CE and by legend was also a meditation master. 6  I will 
examine the relevance of this legend and lack of firm documentation below.  
 
1.4   ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHAT? 
 
In detailed exegetic analysis, attending to examination of the Sanskrit, Chinese and/or 
Tibetan texts and commentaries, recent Western scholarship has cogently argued that 
the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s MMK—as interpreted within the context of the 
entire work and larger Buddhist philosophical literature—primarily concerns the 
nature of time and space in the physical world,7 or that it does not;8 that it has 
metaphysical, epistemic, semantic and/or soteriological intent; 9  that it is about 
physical motion and/or action in general, or action as karma in birth and rebirth 
                                                
6  See Mabbett (1998) for a comprehensive historiography of our uncertainties. See e.g. 
http://www.rinpoche.com/stories/nagarjunalife.htm for the legend according to current authoritative 
teachers.  MMK has roots in the prajñāpāramitā sutras, and I do not imply that there are any Buddhist 
teachings that do not have roots in the direct teachings of the Buddha. 
7  Siderits and O’Brien follow Braumbaugh in interpreting Zeno (as a defender and expander of 
Parmenides’ views) as sounding a death knell to the Pythagorean atomism in time and space which 
was being challenged by the Pythagorean discovery of irrational numbers in mathematics. Their 
analysis considers all four paradoxes as a comprehensive system, while I focus only on the arrow. 
More below. Siderits and O’Brien then examine Nagarjuna’s work in the context of “Indian notions of 
space and time” and the “ultimate atom” (286-7) of space (paramāņu) and time, especially in the 
sāṃkhya, Nyāyá and Sarvāstivāda schools, and mathematics, where rational numbers were also known 
in the 5th or 6th century BCE. “Our aim is to show that some of Nagarjuna’s arguments against 
motion, like Zeno’s Paradoxes, exploit the atomist’s assumptions about continuity and discontinuity of 
space and time” (288). See, however, their footnote 11.  
8 Bhattacharya argues that Nagarjuna’s arguments pertain to grammatical issues in Indian logic, rather 
than what Arnold calls ‘geometrical presuppositions’. Westerhoff (2008) does not quite say that 
Nagarjuna is not addressing physical movement through time and space (that is ‘often’ the 
interpretation), but that “it is possible to read Nagarjuna’s arguments in the second chapter of the 
MMK without regarding them as concerned with the structure of space and time. Doing so has a 
number of advantages” (456). Beyond the justification that the rest of the text or other of the author’s 
extant writings fail to have “any clear claims about the way space and time are structured”, alternative 
interpretations are “more profitable” if we see the text as concerned with properties and instantiating 
individuals. 
9 This covers a lot of territory, and most analysts come under one or the other (or more than one) of 
these three categories. See Arnold’s (2012), discussion of possible interpretations, especially of 
Westerhoff’s (2009, Chapter 6), and Westerhoff himself, and of Oetke (2011) for different categories 
of interpretation. Mine can be seen as a mere reworking of their’s. Arnold focuses on the metaphysical 
and epistemic, while Bhattacharya and to a degree Westerhoff focus on the semantic. See also 
Westerhoff (2008) for a precursor to his (2009), emphasizing the theory of properties, that I place in 
the inner interpretation cluster, lumping semantic and property-nature interpretations. 
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through cyclic existence (samsara);10 that it concerns properties and instantiation, the 
grammar of natural language and its ontological relationship with physical reality;11 
being and becoming; the nature of explanation; 12  the possibility of a rational 
metaphysics; 13  the non-existence of an extralinguistic reality; 14  and that it has 
significant similarities to Zeno’s paradoxes, or that it does not.15 
 Encouraged and enticed by the well-known lack of consensus, I identify three 
interpretation clusters. Very briefly, I label these as outer, inner and secret.  
 
1.5   INTRODUCTION TO THREE INTERPRETATIONS CLUSTERS 
 
The outer cluster is highly materialistic and literal (as mentioned previously) relating 
to space and time as reality (ontic) or our knowledge or explanation of it (epistemic, 
also as mentioned previously, but here categorized together with the ontic), and is 
amenable to analysis by mathematical physics. In the case of the literature of Zeno’s 
Arrow, this has been accomplished, i.e. the paradox has been solved and it is 
paradoxical no more16—although occasional grossly inaccurate analysis periodically 
appears (see below). There are additionally some vaguely plausible objections I 
discuss below. Hence, in an outer interpretation cluster of MMK 2, which is similar to 
the outer interpretation of Zeno’s Arrow, such analysis would have little importance 
in the modern context.   
 The inner cluster indicates interpretations relating to the properties or nature of 
things, and semantics. The inner cluster pertains to semantics due to the way we 
                                                
10 See footnote 12 below. 
11 Other footnotes for this paragraph pertain to these. 
12  As many point out, e.g. Mabbett (1984), “…both [Zeno and Nagarjuna] claimed to show the 
impossibility of giving any coherent logical account of motion” (403). This view—if generalized to be 
their sole purpose, which many do not agree with—would damn them both to historical irrelevance and 
obscurity in the light of modern mathematical physics that shows a quite coherent logical account of 
motion, as discussed in this paper. My contention is that they fail in this purpose, but there are other 
purposes that (I argue here) are deeper and survive analysis. Arnold cites “Nagarjuna’s case against the 
intelligibility of motion…” (553), suggesting that it is not denying motion, per se, but rather denying 
our explanation of it (at the time). 
13 This is a generalization of the previous one.  
14  This is what I would argue is a bizarre conclusion that several authors attribute to Nāgārjuna 
stemming from his conclusion that he could find no rational explanation or understanding of motion, 
hence there was no motion. I discuss this fully below. I.e., the world doesn’t exist because we can’t 
explain it rationally. I doubt that Nāgārjuna thought this, but I don’t know his mind, and find it 
irrelevant to my project anyway. 
15 Most analysts find similarities between Zeno and Nāgārjuna in the mathematical/physical outer 
interpretation cluster, while it is interesting to note that Mabbett (as mentioned previously) and 
Westerhoff (2008) consider that Nagarjuna’s “…soteriological problems of the subject moving (gati) 
through transmigratory existence (samsara)” (Westerhoff, 455) are irrelevant to Zeno—contrary to my 
thesis here. 
16 Salmon’s (1970) introduction to his collection of articles lays out much of the proper solution, also 
available in an adaptation at https://math.dartmouth.edu/~matc/Readers/HowManyAngels/SpaceTime 
Motion/STM.html. Grünbaum (1967) covers similar material, yet gets rather convoluted in the process. 
Mazur (2007) comes close and offers a good historical perspective. See my analysis below. 
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describe the instantiation and/or reification of properties in things, especially as being 
either innate or interdependent. These actions are so entwined with some languages as 
to be ingrained habits of mind to the degree that many people barely imagine thinking 
any other way. Much of the analysis in the inner cluster is dependent or derivative on 
the success of analysis in the outer cluster. Since there is no outer interpretation 
paradox anymore in light of modern analysis, much of the inner interpretations also 
have lost their import in the modern context.  
 The secret cluster pertains to personal meditative journey, hence is called 
soteriological, heuristic, or therapeutic. I have not seen any analysis of Zeno in this 
cluster, while it is frequently pointed out that this is at least one of Nāgārjuna’s 
purposes: “Of course, there is a major difference [between Zeno and MMK verses 
(kārikās)] which, taking the kārikās out of their religious context, we may overlook. 
Nāgārjuna’s dialectic is not mere logic, or even mere metalogic. It is heuristic, or 
therapeutic. Its function is largely to prepare us for meditation or mystic insight” 
(Mabbett 1984, 403). 
 Identifying MMK as therapeutic in purpose supports my own analysis, yet while 
Mabbett acknowledges this purpose, he excludes its relevance to philosophical 
understanding, focusing instead “to clarify what Nāgārjuna means when he writes 
about a certain topic”—what I call the exegesis that I am less interested in. However, 
I argue that identifying MMK as therapeutic does not make it irrelevant to all 
philosophical understanding, just to understanding by the standards of the modern 
context, i.e. modern analytic philosophy. That is because MMK has a soteriological 
purpose independent of the logical validity of its argument and empirical truth of its 
conclusion. By ‘empirical truth’ I indicate that Nāgārjuna may have had the intention 
to present a conclusion that was empirically true—in a correspondence sense of truth 
to correspond with physical reality—but rather in the modern context the conclusion 
of the argument—that there is no motion—does not correspond to physical reality. 
 If—as I will demonstrate—we apply the methods of modern analytic philosophy 
and find that the arguments of MMK and Zeno’s Arrow are not valid and/or are 
fallacious, and we are left with that possibility that what I am calling the secret 
interpretation is the one that might make those ‘arguments’ valid and true, then we 
might consider those arguments more relevant to other philosophical approaches.17 If 
modern analytic philosophy is coincident with what I call ‘the modern context’, i.e., 
“characterized by an emphasis on argumentative clarity and precision, often making 
use of formal logic, conceptual analysis, and, to a lesser degree, mathematics and the 
natural sciences” (Analytic philosophy 2017, 1), then perhaps an experiential sub-
discipline may be more appropriate, such as existentialism or phenomenology. I will 
not, however, examine details of those sub-disciplines in application here, but rather 
approach the secret interpretation through the lens of Buddhist mahamudra. In 
                                                
17 ‘Arguments’ is here in scare quotes because in the secret interpretation we are more concerned with 
their affect on students, rather than their characterization as logically valid, hence they are not quite 
arguments, but more like allegories or metaphors. 
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conjunction with that examination, I will also consider the role of koans in 
philosophy. 
 My focus, after gleaning many possible interpretations of the arguments, is to first 
determine if MMK/2 and Zeno’s Arrow are philosophically coherent using modern 
analytic methods and knowledge of philosophy, logic and science. If we determine 
that they are not, we can choose to either declare them irrelevant to our times or seek 
a solution in an alternative interpretation, such as the therapeutic. I argue against the 
validity of interpretations by Mabbett and other philosophers who interpret MMK 
outside of the therapeutic context. 
 Before we examine the interpretation clusters in detail, I provide some further 
background to the arrow and MMK, Zeno and Nāgārjuna. 
 
1.6  ZENO’S ARROW 
 
We know of Zeno’s paradoxes only from secondary sources. The main source is 
Aristotle in Physics, Book VI, chapter 9, lines 5-9, who interprets Zeno in the outer 
cluster. Aristotle discusses Zeno within a context of an extended discussion of time, 
change and motion, stating that Zeno’s reasoning is fallacious in thinking that 
anything that occupies a location in space equal to its size is necessarily at rest. 
Aristotle says that Zeno is mistakenly assuming that time is discrete. Siderits and 
O’Brien (1976, hereafter S&O), however, following Brumbaugh (1964), suggest that 
the four paradoxes each address one of the permutations of discrete or continuous 
space and time, while the Arrow addresses continuous space and time. Each paradox 
shows that one of the four options lead to absurdity, hence “[w]hether space and time 
were atomistic or infinitely divisible, no intelligible account of motion through them 
was possible” (482). 
 I have found different assessments in the literature as to which of the four 
permutations of discrete (atomistic) or continuous, space and time, are being used by 
Zeno in the Arrow, and by Nāgārjuna in MMK/2. Both, however, are trying to reduce 
all permutation to absurdity. Their purposes have been identified as denial of the 
possibility of (1) motion, (2) any rational metaphysics of motion, (3) pluralism and/or 
monism, (4) any rational metaphysics of any concept, (5) the reality of any concept, 
and/or (6) the possibility of any reality whatsoever. 
 While my argument is not dependent on the fact that science in the modern 
context identifies both space and time as continuous,18 it is important to know that is 
the case in order to counter comments to the contrary. Some philosophers may object, 
and suggest that there is currently some ambivalence about the nature of space and 
time in modern physics theories. Yet, that is not the case. Space and time are both 
continuous in both of our best theories, general relativity and quantum mechanics, at 
least in all empirically accessible spaces and times, regardless of the discrete nature of 
certain measured characteristics of certain entities under certain conditions.  
                                                
18 See Paul (2016b), or Bub (1997, 4). 
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 Relevant to the outer cluster, modern mathematical physics has solved both the 
Arrow and Nāgārjuna’s treatment of the problems of motion, whether we use the 
differential calculus and the real number line to represent continuous space and time, 
or use discrete mathematics as we might when we gather real measurements.19 The 
solution is found in using a modern definition of ‘motion’, as I define below.  
 It is very easy to apply very elementary arithmetic to the physics of moving things 
and get completely overwhelmed with apparently contradictory arguments. For 
example, many analysts still attempt to look at speed as the zero spatial displacement 
of the arrow when in one location at one time divided by the zero temporal 
displacement in one instant. They then get zero divided by zero, which is undefined, 
as support for the paradox. See Papa-Grimaldi (1996) for an example. Thus, they 
conclude the absurdity of motion from the absurdity of that quotient. This kind of 
analysis is complete nonsense. When we analyze this ‘paradox’ using the mature 
calculus and a definition of motion from mature mathematical physics, we find no 
paradox at all.  
 In addition to Aristotle’s and Brumbaugh’s treatments using the outer 
interpretation cluster, we also have some insights into Zeno in the early parts of 
Plato’s dialogue Parmenides co-staring Socrates, Parmenides and Zeno. These 
suggest that the outer and inner interpretation clusters may be overrated, at least, and 
perhaps completely mistaken. This claim requires some unpacking. 
 First, how do interpretations of Zeno relate to interpretations of Nāgārjuna, and 
vice versa? We will see how the first verse MMK/2.1 is very similar to Zeno’s Arrow 
in the outer interpretations, and how the rest of the chapter of the former might be 
used to explicate that first verse, hence can help in understanding the unspecified 
complexities that Zeno might have discussed, and later Zeno-analysts did discuss, 
again while keeping to the outer cluster. Hence, we can see how outer interpretations 
of Nāgārjuna might assist understanding Zeno, at least if we are very narrow in our 
focus, and similarly how later analysis of Zeno by ancient and modern philosophers 
may also help us understand and explicate MMK/2, in the outer cluster.  
 Yet, when we broaden the focus to understand that Nāgārjuna’s inner 
interpretation cluster to his entire project may be central to the meaning of the chapter 
and text, have we lost any connection with Zeno? I argue that we haven’t. There is no 
reason to believe that Zeno’s Arrow is simply about an Arrow, just as Plato’s Cave is 
certainly not about a cave. Applying the inner cluster of MMK to Zeno, the arrow is a 
metaphor for a larger set of philosophical issues, including movement as a property of 
an object, and instantiation/reification in our language customs. There is no reason 
not to take these interpretations as hidden meanings of Zeno’s Arrow, and I will do 
so.  
 When we further broaden the significance of MMK to the secret or 
soteriological/therapeutic cluster, which has been said by many to be the actual 
significance and purpose of the philosophical treatise, then we will have to take a leap 
                                                
19 I offer the conjecture that the Doppler-redshift method described below to measure velocity can be 
done with continuous data with analog measurements not requiring discrete sampling. 
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into a secret interpretation of Zeno’s Arrow if we are to find some inter-utility. This, 
however, is the core purpose of my essay. 
 
1.7  PARMENIDES AND ZENO 
 
We see from Plato’s Parmenides, that Zeno is one of, if not the most direct disciple 
and main philosophic student of Parmenides. We must remember that philosophy in 
those days was not distinct from religion.20 In the parlance of the third interpretive 
cluster, he is Parmenides’ spiritual heir. This relationship suggests that the practices 
and resulting viewpoints of Parmenides—as attributed to him by Kingsley and 
Lombardo—were also practiced and shared by Zeno. Therefore, we might be well 
advised to interpret his paradoxes in this light. This brings us to the secret 
interpretation cluster for Zeno, which then we can see corresponds to the secret 
interpretation cluster for MMK/2.  
 Socrates comments that Zeno is as opposed to plurality as to monism.21 This 
demonstrates further similarities between Zeno and Nāgārjuna in their method of 
arguing by reduction against all views. It may even be that they have similar 
purposes, contrary to most assessments.   
 How does this dialogue relate with Zeno’s paradoxes? Nick Hugget’s (2010) 
article suggests that the pluralist approach is to examine parts, which have parts, etc., 
yielding infinite spatial parts that cannot result in a finite distance—the classical view 
that is contrary to our modern context. But this is the outer, and perhaps somewhat 
inner interpretation cluster view. 
 In the context of the third interpretation cluster as informed for Zeno’s Arrow by 
Kingsley (2003) and Lombardo (1982), and for MMK by such as Mabbett, Conze, 
Gyamtso and many more, when we look closely at Parmenides’ fragments and 
consider how MMK is used in some teachings, we can interpret the monistic ‘one’ to 
represent pristine, non-conceptual awareness (jñāna or perhaps rigpa22) that does not 
change, hence exhibits stability, while the pluralist ‘many’ represents thoughts and 
emotions, wholesome and unwholesome (kleśa), that come and go within that stable 
stillness. Hence, the arrow’s movement is a metaphor for movement of mind. Such 
movement is observed, yet we also experience the stillness of mind. By analysis we 
cannot have both, hence we have a paradox designed as a koan to interrupt fixation on 
rational philosophy. 
                                                
20 See Lombardo (1982/2010, vii). 
21 Consider similariries to the Madhyamaka neither one nor many argument. That classical Buddhist 
argument is found in detail in Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakalankara, Adornment of the Middle Way 
(Padmakara 2005). 
22 "The omniscient eye of pristine awareness is an eyeball looking in all directions simultaneously, in 
the total 360 degree vision of the holistic seed, the source of space-time in the zero dimension. In 
rigpa, no temporal processes take place; there is no motion..." (Longchenpa's Precious Treasury of 
Natural Perfection / Keith Dowman) It is also called ‘spontaneous presence’; jñāna is also pristine 
awareness. All these terms might apply to the fruition of incubation—hard to judge which, since there 
aren’t too many practicing Pythagorans to tell us. 
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 We might ask whether koans have any place in a philosophical discussion if the 
purpose of koans is to interrupt fixation on rational philosophy, or to even interrupt 
fixation on rational thought altogether. Here is where we must distinguish modern 
analytic philosophy—highly focused on rationality as it is—from more experience-
focused philosophy, perhaps existentialism or phenomenology. The reader is 
therefore invited to bring in both the rational analytic and experience-based 
philosophic literature on emotions, insight, will, belief and consciousness of a living 
person, along with religious philosophy, in all of which consideration of koans 
belong. I, however, do not accept that broad scope invitation here, but rather consider 
koans in a limited context of the experience of mahamudra meditation practice, as 
discussed below. 
 Lombardo and Kingsley associate Parmenides with the Greek shamanistic 
tradition elaborated in more detail by Kingsley. Parmenides’ poem portrays “that the 
universe and our minds form a mutually committed whole” (Lombardo 1982, vii), 
which reminds us of the Vedic view of microcosm in the body reflecting macrocosm 
of the universe.  
 Lombardo hypothesizes that Empedocles and Parmenides “trained themselves in 
some kind of formal meditation practice, perhaps Pythagorean in origin, and that 
there are hints of what this was in the fragments” (viii). Kingsley elaborates the 
practice as what was called ‘incubation’, a retreat in a completely dark cave for an 
extended period of time, even as long as a year. During this meditation, the spirit 
migrates to the underworld—which can be interpreted as death of the self-centered 
ego that interprets everything in terms of its own edification. Once ego is destroyed 
during this dark retreat, in the Buddhist terminology the person can become fully 
realized to the innate compassion and wisdom of original mind.  
 In the underworld, according to his poem, Parmenides’ spirit received instruction 
in the nature of reality from ‘the Goddess’. In the eighth fragment, Parmenides recites 
the Goddess’ instructions on the road to “WHAT IS”: “There is only one tale of a 
path left to tell: that is. And along this way there are many, many signs that as well as 
being birthless it is also deathless and whole and of a single kind and unmoving—and 
neither is it incomplete” (Kingsley 2003, 160). 
 Here we find the roots of Zeno’s paradoxes, to establish that motion is impossible. 
But it is not the motion of an arrow that is impossible. Rather, it is the plurality of the 
world, while its physical unity is embodied in the single all-encompassing physical 
universe, and its spiritual unity in spontaneous presence (Tib: lhündrup); it is being 
without attachment in the present moment, rather than lost in thought about past and 
future, or even being attached to what is happening in the present moment—also 
called the fourth moment,23 awareness uncluttered by ego. “Wherever it seems that 
                                                
23 "Beyond Present, Past, and Future Is The Fourth Moment.....totality is taking place. A very precise 
something or other is happening. That is the state of vipashyana. It is nonverbal and nonconceptual and 
very electric. It is neither ecstasy nor a state of dullness. Rather, a state of “hereness” is taking place, 
which is described in the Tibetan Buddhist literature as nowness.” Trungpa Rinpoche, 
<http://www.shambhalasun.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2883&Itemid=0>. 
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you go, or come, everything happens in your consciousness. And that consciousness 
never moves, is always the same”24 (Kingsley 2003, 80). 
 Now we can access the experience, insights, concepts and terminology of 
Buddhist Mahāmudrā teachings. 25  Lack of motion is stability of mind, which is 
realization of the Buddhist calm abiding (śamatha) meditation practice. Hence, the 
arrow is a mere metaphor for the mind that is always immovable, while thoughts of 
distant lands pop up and blow away. The mind as the ocean of awareness of thoughts 
rests in stability, even while there are ripples and waves of movement of thoughts or 
emotions that are self-liberated into their own luminous nature as awareness becomes 
aware of them. It is the unity of plurality and monism as the unity of mental 
movement within stillness. 
 
1.8  NAGARJUNA’S ARROW 
 
There are several examinations of MMK/2, and the reader is invited to look at those 
for more complete analysis. I merely scratch the surface here to make my point. 
 Here we just look at the first verse, as the core expression of similarity with Zeno:  
 
MMK 2.1 
(S&K) 
Gataṃ na gamyate tāvadagatam naiva gamyate 
gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyata 
 
Just as the path traversed is not being traversed, neither is the path not yet 
traversed being traversed. The path presently being traversed that is distinct from 
the portions of path traversed and not yet traversed is not being traversed. (32) 
 
(Garfield, 1995) 
What has been moved is not moving. 
What has not been moved is not moving. 
Apart from what has been moved and what has not been moved, 
Movement cannot be conceived. (6) 
 
(Gyamtso, 2003) 
On the path that has been traveled, there is no moving. 
On the path that has not been traveled, there is no moving either, 
And in some other place besides the path that has been traveled and the path that 
has not, 
Motions are not perceptible in any way at all. (13) 
 
                                                
24 “Wherever you go, there you are”, Buckeroo Bonzai (movie). 
25 These can be found in texts by Wangchuk Dorje, e.g. (2001), and commentaries by Khenchen 
Thrangu, Rinpoche (2003, 2004) and Tenzin (2014). 
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 The similarity to Zeno is clear on the outer/ontic interpretation cluster. In that 
cluster, this verse establishes the initial supposition that motion (or at least the 
rational understanding of it) cannot be possible in any of the three times. That is how 
S&K, S&O and Gyamtso (hereafter, Khenpo, Rinpoche) interpret the verse. Garfield 
and Kalupahana, however, immediately interpret this verse in terms of the reified 
inherent nature of my inner (semantic/property nature) interpretation cluster. Yet, the 
inner is dependent and derivative of the outer: since there is no movement in the past 
or future, the object didn’t move and will not move, hence doesn’t now move, hence 
there is no inherent property of movement in the object.  
 
The target of Nāgārjuna’s arguments in this chapter is any view of motion according to 
which motion is an entity, or a property with an existence independent of that of moving 
things, or according to which motion is part of the nature of moving things. (Garfield, 
1995, 124) 
 
This is in the inner cluster. However, to establish this, Garfield begins his 
commentary of the first verse with the outer interpretation: 
 
That is, if motion exists, there must be sometime at which it exists. Nāgārjuna in this 
opening verse considers the past and the future. This makes good sense. For motion 
requires a change of position, and a change of position must occur over time. But the 
present has no duration. So if motion were to exist, it would have to exist either in the 
past or in the future. But a thing that has moved only in the past is not now moving. Nor 
is a thing yet to be moved. (125) 
 
The other interpreters examine other verses and chapters in similar fashion to Garfield 
and Kalupahana on this verse; hence the inner interpretation cluster is generally the 
favorite, yet the outer interpretation must be applied to establish the ground of the 
inner.  
 Hence, the logical validity of the inner cluster is largely based on the scientific 
and mathematical validity of the initial paradox in the outer interpretation—and I 
argue that there is none, i.e. there is no scientific and mathematical validity, no 
paradox, and the object moves in all three times (see below). Hence, there is no 
logical validity of the inner cluster, even though the conclusion may or may not be 
true (that there is no inherent nature), since it is outside the scope of the outer 
interpretation. It is just the argument for it that is invalid. 
 As mentioned, Aristotle and others suggest that Zeno is using infinitesimals to 
argue for his paradox that concludes there is no motion. Aristotle argues against Zeno 
by appeal to continuous space and time, and most modern mathematical-scientific 
treatments of Zeno’s Arrow follow Aristotle to show that motion in the outer cluster 
exists, by using the calculus (see below). Commentary on MMK usually places it in 
the context of a critique of atomism. Nāgārjuna’s arguments against atomism use a 
rudimentary understanding of continuity, which is the major classical alternative. 
However, commentary typically fails to point out that his arguments display a lack of 
understanding of continuity. His arguments do not entail valid denials of continuity as 
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used in modern mathematical-scientific treatments, although many analysts seem to 
argue that they do.  
 Different verses of MMK/2 are interpreted to examine different assumptions of 
discrete or continuous space and time, just as Brumbaugh (1964), Battacharya (1980-
81) and S&O argue that Zeno is examining them in different paradoxes. Regardless of 
the use of discrete or continuous space and time, the analysis fails to hold up to 
modern scrutiny. 
 In the next section I will examine each interpretation cluster in more detail. I will 
also demonstrate how modern mathematical physics denies the outer interpretation 
cluster, and with it justification for the inner. We will be left with the secret, unless 
we wish to banish both of those philosophers to the confines of merely historical 
relevance.  
 
2. THREE INTERPRETATION CLUSTERS 
 
2.1  OUTER—PHYSICAL MOTION INTERPRETATION CLUSTER 
 
The ontic aspect of the outer interpretation cluster includes what Westerhoff calls the 
spatio-temporal, what S&O calls the mathematical, and what most analysts at least 
begin their examination of the chapter. This is the interpretation that MMK/2 
concerns paradoxes of physical motion that demonstrate how such motion is not 
possible. The epistemic aspect of the outer interpretation combines what Arnold 
(2012) calls a concern with explanation and many identify as concern with denial of 
metaphysics altogether. The core of the epistemic view is that any reasonable 
sounding understanding or explanation of motion results in absurdity.  
 This epistemic conclusion has consequences relating to the ontic interpretation of 
this cluster, connected by what I call the Eleatic Logic that the lack of a rational 
explanation of a phenomenon entails that the phenomena lacks some sense of 
‘reality’, i.e. motion is not possible if we don’t understand it. Many Greek, Indian, 
Tibetan and Western philosophers—ancient and contemporary—argue based on this 
connection. I label them ‘rationalists’. The argument is, of course, senseless to 
modern empiricists, scientists and most Western analytic philosophers.  
 Both Zeno’s Arrow paradox and the MMK/2 textual arguments, as interpreted in 
the outer interpretation cluster, are not coherent in the modern context, because (a) 
the logic is fallacious, in that even though motion was not understood for most of 
history it still was a real phenomenon, and (b) the premise is false in the modern 
context, in that we now have a complete and valid explanation and understanding of 
motion (see below). Hence, there is no reason to think that motion is illusory in any 
regard, although it is of course dependent on the things that move. 
 Following, yet enhancing, Salmon’s introduction to his (1970) we can utilize 
modern mathematical physics with a modern definition of motion and find no 
vagueness, paradox or absurdity. In the modern context, motion at a point is defined 
as instantaneous velocity. Instantaneous velocity is defined beginning with average 
 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 8.2 (2017)  PAUL 
 
81 
velocity—but not stopping there. Average velocity does not entail any suggestion of 
vagueness: first the arrow is at the bow, later the arrow is in the tree. Neither does 
instantaneous velocity entail vagueness, since it is the limit of the sequence of average 
velocities as the intervals get smaller and approach the point in question, and not 
actually one of the average velocities. 
 At most points in the flight of an arrow, average velocity is the simple ratio of 
distance to time in a specified spatial and temporal interval. Consider an inflight 
interval that includes a particular point P where we want to know the instantaneous 
velocity, the motion at point P. There are two ways to measure velocity at a point. 
First, we may use Doppler-redshift technology, similar to getting the velocity of stars. 
This might even be made continuous, rather than point-by-point. This is a perfectly 
valid technique, available for 100 years. This can also be used at the endpoints of 
flight. 
 Alternatively, we might use techniques that have been available for 400 years: We 
start with an arbitrary interval containing that point, and then simply reduce the 
distance and time interval towards that point. We therefore get a series of average 
velocities vn = (xn+1 – xn)/(tn+1 –tn) as n goes from 1 to N, an arbitrarily large number. 
Since time, space and motion are continuous, eventually (as n increases) we will get 
to the point in this series where the series is ‘smooth’, i.e. in the limit for small 
increments in space and time the series varies little compared with the magnitude of 
each value (vn – vn-1)<<vn. If we are not at the stopping or starting times, or if no 
significant change happens, like a rock deflecting the arrow, the series will converge 
to a value V, the instantaneous velocity at point P. If P is at one of those deflection 
points, we must deal with it in different ways (single sided sequence to the point), but 
there is no problem in doing so. There are standard methods to determine 
convergence. 
 Measurements are generally discrete, and these methods refer to the actuality of 
experiment, not simply the theory of continuous spaces.  
 Average velocity is never defined at a point in space and time. Only the 
convergent point limit is defined at such a point, and it is not ever 0/0 for any physical 
motion.26 This definition makes all the difference: motion becomes coherent, and 
such rational coherence reflects the empirical fact that things move from one place to 
another, i.e. that motion is real.   
 In addition to physical motion, the outer interpretation cluster also pertains to 
contexts of persons ‘traveling’ through samsara—the sense of change in normal 
experience of people who are not realized meditation masters—or more general 
action, change, and agency. However, analyses in this outer cluster typically rely on 
either the analysis or at least the analogy of denial of physical motion to justify their 
own various denials of different kinds of motions. To the degree that this is the case, 
if I am correct in my assessment of interpretations of spatio-temporal objects, then 
such denial of these different motions is similarly fallacious in the modern context. 
                                                
26 Salmon’s (1970) introduction covers this appropriately. Many previous and even later authors ignore 
this central nuance. 
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 Since many arguments in the literature do invoke such foundations: ‘just as with 
the physical arrow, so also in regard to people, generic change, change of properties 
or experiential journey’, they too are fallacious.  
 Rather than consign Zeno and Nāgārjuna to merely historical significance, I argue 
the outer interpretation is a very superficial interpretation of these texts. It seems 
problematic to presume that either Zeno or Nāgārjuna had such a superficial 
understanding of their philosophy as that which is demonstrated by the physical 
motion context of the outer interpretation cluster. After all, it is obvious that the arrow 
moves from bow to tree, hence there is motion throughout the flight. Only a fool 
would deny that, as demonstrated by Albert Simony’s27 vignette of Zeno not getting 
out of a lion’s path because he judges it is impossible for the lion to move, or 
Mabbett’s (1984) vignette of Nāgārjuna not taking cover when Zeno anachronistically 
fired an arrow at him. Poor, dead Zeno and Nāgārjuna. It is astounding that these 
vignettes are considered arguments against the paradox and MMK verses, like we 
consider the authors as idiots. If we give them a little credit for not being idiots, this 
actually demonstrates not that they made no sense, but rather that our outer 
interpretations don’t make sense.28 Luckily, we have other potential interpretations.29   
 
2.2   INNER (SEMANTIC/PROPERTY-NATURE) INTERPRETATION 
CLUSTER 
 
The second interpretation cluster in my categories is the inner, or more descriptively 
the semantic/property-nature interpretation. This has two aspects. The semantic 
aspect combines interpretations that depend intimately on the semantic use of what 
Hayes (1994) calls Nāgārjuna's ‘equivocation fallacy’ and Taber (1998) explicates as 
‘co-existing counterparts’. In MMK/2 we find it as the pairs of terms ‘mover’ and 
‘moving’, and also as the ‘locus of motion’ and the ‘action of motion’. Analysis by 
Nāgārjuna, at least as interpreted by Candrakīrti in the Prasannapadā (Sprung 1979) 
and those who rely on the latter, then proceed to demonstrate, for example, the 
absurdity of having the ‘inherent property’ of motion in something that is a mover, 
since it is not such a property when the mover doesn’t move. Kalupahana and 
Garfield make this point in their commentaries. We must remember that the common 
interpretation of the entire text is that it denies any inherent properties of any sort of 
                                                
27 in Salmon (1970) 
28  Some might accuse me of Whiggishness, by judging sense by today’s mathematical physics 
standards. I reply: First, I am being entirely Whiggish in trying to determine what of this ‘ancient 
wisdom’ makes sense today. That is what concerns me. Only historians of philosophy should be 
interested in what doesn’t make sense by today’s standards but made sense in historical times using 
standards of understanding (science and logic) that we have thoroughly discredited today. Second, 
Eleatic Logic never made sense. It was never sensible to say that if we didn’t understand a 
phenomenon then the phenomenon is unreal, rather than saying that we need to find a good 
explanation to understand the phenomenon, and the phenomenon right in front of us is obviously real. 
Third, clearly things move, and that must have been clear to the ancients. What they were trying to do 
must not have been to deny the reality of physical motion. 
29 For other physical-mathematical interpretations of MMK, see Paul (2013, 2016a, 2016b). 
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any thing. Closely related to that context is the property-nature aspect of this 
interpretation as discussed by Garfield (1995) and Westerhoff (2009). The 
equivocation fallacy is now explained within the view that MMK concerns the nature 
of properties and their instantiation as reification of an inherent nature. We are told 
that it is the reification itself that results in paradoxes and absurdity. The purpose of 
Nāgārjuna’s arguments, therefore, is to convince students to realize that when we give 
up reification, the ‘emptiness’ of all things is revealed. This is śūnyatā, that all things 
are empty of inherent nature. In this interpretation cluster of MMK/2, what Nāgārjuna 
is saying is that moving is not an inherent property of a mover, and rather is a 
property of the interaction and relationship between the mover and its movement. 
Emphasis on interaction and relationality demonstrates the central purpose of MMK, 
which is to explicate śūnyatā. 
 As we have seen, validity of the inner interpretations is dependent on validity of 
the outer. If they are fallacious, as I argue, then we are left with the next interpretation 
as the one that seems more than likely to represent what is actually being attempted 
by both Nāgārjuna and Zeno. 
 
2.3   SECRET INTERPRETATION CLUSTER 
 
The third, soteriological, or what I call the ‘secret’ interpretation, involves personal 
psychological and/or spiritual journey. In order to examine the secret interpretation, 
we need to step over or beyond purely rational, logical and scientific analysis to view 
the ultimate context of the authors’ purpose. In other words, we have to examine our 
own experience in our own journey, and we have to examine it non-conceptually. In 
this view, we take the stance that Nāgārjuna and Zeno were not strictly philosophers 
and logicians, but rather additionally were meditation masters in their respective 
traditions, a claim I discuss below. As such, all of their rational analysis has a purpose 
that is not purely rational or even philosophical or intellectual, but rather is explicitly 
designed to assist fellow travelers on a path towards what some might call liberation 
(mokṣa) or enlightenment. Enlightenment, in this context, is more descriptively called 
discovery of the true and ultimate nature of our own minds: what is called the pristine 
state that embodies mindfulness and awareness (smṛti), spontaneous presence, and 
direct, non-conceptual experience. In order to understand this interpretation cluster, 
we must be meditation students. 
 In those ‘shamanic-spiritual-mystical traditions’, or simply in Buddhist 
mahamudra, as an example, it is acknowledged that direct experience is not 
conceptual, that such direct experience embodies knowledge, thus use of concepts is 
laden with metaphor, analogy, simile, action, interaction, poetry, koans, meditation 
and art designed to point the student towards awakenment to the mystery of being that 
cannot be described in words. 
 The secret interpretation cluster pertains to the affect that Zeno’s and Nāgārjuna’s 
arguments have on people who are on a personal, experiential journey of meditation 
and discovery. It is because of this that our paucity of documentation supporting the 
claim that they were spiritual masters is not relevant. For Nāgārjuna, it is sufficient 
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that the living teachers say that he was one, hence the words of the MMK are verbally 
taught to have the motivation and import that a spiritual master would embody, e.g. 
compassion and wisdom. For Zeno, we have documentation that he was a major 
student, if not the direct disciple of Parmenides, and that Parmenides was a spiritual 
master. Hence, if it is possible to interpret the paradoxes as the words of a spiritual 
master, it makes sense to do so.  
 This soteriological interpretation cluster is not quite as connected to the space-
time aspect of the outer interpretation cluster as interpretations in the other two 
clusters, hence not quite as susceptible to dismissal in the modern context. In the 
secret interpretation, ‘motion’ refers to motion of mind, which is a ‘movement’ of 
thoughts and emotions. Denial of motion then becomes acknowledgement of innate 
stability of mind. This stability or stillness is discovered in calm abiding (śamatha) 
meditation, which results in mindfulness—being present and attentive to the body in 
space and time, and to the passing ebb and flow of movement of mind manifesting as 
thoughts or emotions. Stability is not a state of having no thoughts, but rather is a 
state of not being distracted by thoughts or emotions. Such distraction manifests when 
we follow thoughts into elaborate stories of life unrelated to the present moment, such 
as in regret about the past, anticipation about the future, or in philosophic 
contemplation. 
 How does the philosophical presentation of motion by Zeno and Nāgārjuna relate 
to mental stability achieved in personal journey? One possible answer is that once 
motion and the inherent nature of phenomena are denied, and/or absurdity is 
determined from all attempts at rational understanding of how motion could exist, 
such as presented by both authors, and we realize the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all 
phenomena, we would then give up attachment to language, concepts, and conceptual 
knowledge altogether in order to walk a path to realization of non-conceptual gnosis, 
the non-dual wisdom (prajñā) that directly ‘sees’ śūnyatā, the empty nature of all 
phenomena.  
 This soteriological interpretation requires only that the recipient of the teachings 
drop her attachment to rationality, logic, abstract analysis and science in order to 
reach into her mind, heart and body to obtain direct instructions on the nature of 
reality derived from her own experience (the ‘Goddess’, the mother prajñāpāramitā, 
the wisdom that ‘sees’ śūnyatā). Yet, there is still some dependence on being 
convinced, by the lack of a consistent logic, that logic is not sufficient to complete 
knowledge. These arguments are not convincing to scientifically sophisticated 
modern audiences.  
 In an alternate one of the interpretations in this cluster, Zeno and Nāgārjuna are 
using logic as a koan technique to demonstrate the limits of logic. They set up a 
problem that cannot be solved by logic—like asking for the sound of one hand 
clapping, or in this case how motion could exist when the object is always in one spot 
at any one time. The purpose is to suggest that some questions cannot be answered 
with concepts, logic and rational analysis. A koan has no purpose to convince us of 
anything. It is designed to stop our thinking mind. That mind can start up again with 
rational responses of at least two kinds: by stating that the question is absurd, or by 
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finding a rational answer such as the fingers hammering the palm to make a sound of 
one hand clapping, or by explaining motion with mathematical physics. Yet, that is 
not the point of a koan. The koan has the purpose to introduce us to our original mind 
that exists prior to rational analysis. Then, through extended meditation, we look 
closer and might discover non-conceptual wisdom. 
 In the first interpretation of this cluster, we must have confidence, even certainty, 
in the logic that demonstrates the absurdity of applying logic to all problems. Only 
then will we have full confidence in the view that enables us to open our mind in 
order to directly perceive the true nature of reality. This confidence arises in different 
minds through different processes: some use philosophy and science; some reject one 
or both and instead use devotion alone. Devotion is an easier path, and koans are 
designed to assist students on that path. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
Zeno’s paradoxes are usually interpreted as a critique of generic change in a pluralist 
worldview. They do so using examples of spatio-temporal motion of physical objects. 
Such motion was not explainable 2400 years ago, resulting in the belief that motion, 
or more generic change, and pluralism generally, was perhaps problematic and 
perhaps illusory. I examined only The Arrow.  
 Nāgārjuna’s MMK/2 addresses similar problems with similar arguments and 
conclusions, although since we have many verses in the context of a large, ancient 
text and many commentaries in several languages we also have many more and 
diverse interpretations. 
 I identified several interpretations of MMK/2 and categorized them in three 
clusters. The outer pertains to change of physical things or generic change. The inner 
pertains to properties and nature, e.g. inherent nature, and semantics. The secret 
pertains to a personal, spiritual, experiential path of meditation.  
 I argued that the outer interpretation cluster was incoherent in a modern, 21st 
century context of analytic philosophy and science. I also argued that many other 
interpretations were incoherent because they depended on coherence of the outer. We 
are left with the secret. In this cluster, both Nāgārjuna and Zeno are considered to be 
meditation masters, MMK/2 and Zeno’s Arrow are both koans designed to stop the 
mind from fixation on logic and concept, rather than being rational explications using 
logic and analytic philosophy. 
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